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ABSTRACT: Recently, there have been some attempts to block the Knowability Paradox and other modal paradoxes 
by adopting a type-theoretic framework in which knowledge and necessity are regarded as typed predicates. 
The main problem with this approach is that when these notions are simultaneously treated as predicates, a 
new kind of paradox appears. I claim that avoiding this paradox either by weakening the Knowability Prin-
ciple or by introducing types for both predicates is rather messy and unattractive. I also consider the pro-
spect of using the truth predicate to emulate necessity, knowledge and other modal notions. It turns out 
that this idea works much better. 
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RESUMEN: Recientemente, ha habido intentos por resolver la Paradoja de la Cognoscibilidad y otras paradojas moda-
les por medio de la adopción de un enfoque de tipos en el cual las nociones de conocimiento y necesidad se 
representan utilizando predicados tipeados. El principal problema con esta propuesta es que cuando estas 
nociones son tratadas simultáneamente como predicados, una nueva clase de paradoja aparece. En este ar-
tículo sostengo que evitar esta paradoja debilitando el Principio de Cognoscibilidad o introduciendo tipos 
para ambos predicados no es una solución atractiva. También considero una propuesta alternativa, la de 
utilizar el predicado veritativo para emular las nociones de necesidad, conocimiento y otras nociones moda-
les. Resulta que esta última idea funciona mucho mejor.. 
Palabras clave: El Argumento de la Cognoscibilidad; Enfoque de tipos; Autorreferencia; Paradojas multimodales;   
Verdad. 
1. Introduction 
Recently some attempts have been made to block the Knowability Argument (some-
times also called the Knowability Paradox) and certain modal paradoxes by adopting a 
type-theoretic framework in which knowledge and necessity are regarded as typed 
predicates. The main problem with this approach is that when these notions are simul-
taneously treated as (typed or untyped) predicates, a new kind of paradox—one that is 
immune to type restrictions—can be constructed. I claim that avoiding this paradox 
either by proposing a very weak form of the Knowability Principle or by introducing 
types for all paradox-generating predicates is rather messy and unattractive. I also con-
sider the prospect of using the truth predicate to emulate other modal notions. It 
turns out that this idea has several attractive features.  
                                                      
* I am very grateful to two anonymous referees for their comments. I owe special thanks to Eduardo Bar-
rio, Eleonora Cresto, Paulo Faría, Volker Halbach, Federico Pailos, Lavinia Picollo, Diego Tajer and 
to audiences at the Third New College Logic Meeting (Oxford) and Segundo Congreso Latinoamericano de 
Filosofía Analítica (Buenos Aires). This paper would not have been written without the financial sup-
port of CONICET. 
Lucas ROSENBLATT 
Theoria 80 (2014): 201-221 
202 
 The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 I offer a version of the Knowability 
Argument and a sketch of how the type theoretic approach is useful to block not only 
this argument but also the usual paradoxes of self-reference. In section 3 I introduce a 
problem for the type-theoretic approach posed by Volker Halbach and I present three 
possible replies available to the type-theorist. The rest of the paper considers each of 
these replies. In section 4 I consider the possibility of embracing only a very weak 
form of the Knowability Principle. In section 5 I evaluate the idea of having types for 
every modal predicate. It turns out that both options are subject to serious problems. 
In section 6 I argue for the idea of using truth to emulate modal notions such as 
knowledge and necessity. In section 7 I build a simplified axiomatic system involving 
truth, necessity and knowledge to illustrate the sort of theory I have in mind. In sec-
tion 8 I show how this axiomatic system blocks every self-referential paradox          
expressible in the system while validating the Knowability Argument. Section 9, the 
last one, contains some closing remarks. 
2. The Knowability Argument  
In recent years the Knowability Argument1 (sometimes called the “Knowability Para-
dox” or the “Fitch-Church Paradox”) has provoked a number of different reactions. 
Some philosophers think that the argument motivates the rejection of the so-called 
“Knowability Principle”, according to which every truth is knowable. 
[KP]  ϕ → ◊ ⌜K ⌜ϕ⌝⌝       Knowability Principle2 
It is quite simple to show that this principle together with other reasonable principles 
and rules for knowledge and necessity lead to unpleasant consequences. Assume that 
the following principles from modal and epistemic logic hold:  
[K∧-dist] K ⌜ϕ ∧ ψ⌝ → K ⌜ϕ⌝ ∧ K ⌜ψ⌝  Distribution of K over ∧ 
[K-fact]  K ⌜ϕ⌝ → ϕ         Factivity of Knowledge 
[□-nec] If ⊦ ϕ, then ⊦ □ ⌜ϕ⌝      Necessitation for Necessity 
It is clear then that using these principles we can prove □ ⌜¬K ⌜ϕ ∧ ¬K ⌜ϕ⌝⌝⌝, or 
equivalently, ¬◊ ⌜K ⌜ϕ ∧ ¬K ⌜ϕ⌝⌝⌝. For we have  
K ⌜ϕ ∧ ¬K ⌜ϕ⌝⌝ → K ⌜ϕ⌝ ∧ K ⌜¬K ⌜ϕ⌝⌝  by [K∧-dist] 
K ⌜ϕ⌝ ∧ K ⌜¬K ⌜ϕ⌝⌝ → K ⌜ϕ⌝ ∧ ¬K ⌜ϕ⌝  by [K-fact] 
                                                      
1 The reader interested in the Knowability Argument can see Fitch’s classic paper (Fitch 1963). More up-
dated versions of the paradox and some discussions surrounding it can be found in (Salerno 2009).   
2 Because of certain aspects of the discussion that will come up later, possibility ◊(x), necessity □(x) and 
knowledge K(x) are treated as predicates. I will assume that every formula of the language has a 
name. So for any formula ϕ, the expression ⌜ϕ⌝ should be understood as a term that denotes the 
(code of the) sentence ϕ (for an appropriate coding of the expressions of the language). Also, the 
knowledge predicate is usually thought to be implicitly indexed by a time and an agent. K ⌜ϕ⌝ stands 
for “someone at some time knows that ϕ”. Unless stated otherwise, throughout the paper the agent 
and the time indexes will be kept fixed and hence will be omitted.    
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K ⌜ϕ ∧ ¬K ⌜ϕ⌝⌝ → K ⌜ϕ⌝ ∧ ¬K ⌜ϕ⌝   by Logic 
This means that K ⌜ϕ ∧ ¬K ⌜ϕ⌝⌝ leads to a contradiction. But then, classical logic 
gives us:   
¬K ⌜ϕ ∧ ¬K ⌜ϕ⌝⌝ 
Applying [□-nec] we obtain a formula equivalent to  
¬◊ ⌜K ⌜ϕ ∧ ¬K ⌜ϕ⌝⌝⌝ 
Now notice that a possible instance of [KP] is the following:  
ϕ ∧ ¬K ⌜ϕ⌝ → ◊ ⌜K ⌜ϕ ∧ ¬K ⌜ϕ⌝⌝⌝. 
But then logical reasoning gives us 
¬(ϕ ∧ ¬K ⌜ϕ⌝) 
which is (classically) equivalent to  
ϕ → K ⌜ϕ⌝3  
This last sentence informally asserts that every truth is known. But most people (those 
who do not subscribe to a very strong form of verificationism) will agree that the 
Principle of Non-Omniscience is acceptable:  
(Non-Omniscience)  Some truth is not known.   
Therefore, if the other modal rules are sound and classical logic is not questioned, we 
end up with an inconsistency: every truth is known and some truth is not known.  
 This argument is usually thought to be problematic for the anti-realist philosopher, 
since the thesis that every truth is knowable is taken to be a central ingredient of her 
viewpoint. This has to do with the fact that the principle relates truth to knowability, 
the idea being that there are no truths beyond the epistemic capacity of the potential 
agents. As a matter of fact, the proof above is sometimes considered as a direct refuta-
tion of various forms of anti-realism. 
 There is a different reading of the argument available. Some philosophers think 
that it is a mistake to frame the discussion as one between realists and anti-realists. 
They claim that the argument is a genuine paradox, since it collapses the reasonable 
(although perhaps false) philosophical claim that every truth is knowable into the un-
acceptable claim that every truth is known.4   
 Under this reading, it becomes crucial to block the argument. Some philosophers 
believe that the Knowability Principle can be saved (and the paradox avoided) if some 
restriction on the set of instances of the Principle is set up. Among the many ways to 
restrict the Knowability Principle discussed in the literature, I am only interested here 
in the possibility of adopting a type-theoretic restriction. The advantage of adopting a 
                                                      
3 In this derivation a couple of simplifications were made. First, instead of using quantification over 
propositions or over objects I used schematic versions of the relevant principles. Second, I was being 
very sloppy with the notation. For example, in K ⌜¬ϕ⌝ the symbol ¬ is not the negation symbol but 
a function that applied to the code of ϕ gives the code of its negation.   
4 See (Kvandig 2008) for a defense of this reading. Some (convincing) arguments against it can be found 
in (Jenkins 2009).  
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solution of this sort is evident. Since other well-known paradoxes can be avoided us-
ing type restrictions, the type-theoretic framework can provide a unified answer to 
many (maybe all) different paradoxes, assuming that the Knowability Argument in-
deed constitutes a paradox.5 
 To start with a familiar example, take the truth predicate T. There are different 
ways of implementing type restrictions within a theory of truth. One possibility is to 
syntactically ban all sentences of the form T ⌜ϕ⌝ if ϕ contains an occurrence of T. 
Another possibility is to restrict the proof-theoretic principles in which T is involved. 
For example, if we have a base theory ! capable of self-reference and T is added to 
the language ℒ! of !, instead of accepting the full unrestricted T-schema 
(T-schema)  T ⌜ϕ⌝ ↔ ϕ 
we only accept those instances of the T-schema in which ϕ is a formula of the lan-
guage ℒ!. In this paper I will consider only typed theories of this sort, although noth-
ing crucial hangs on this.  
 A more sophisticated version of the proof-theoretic way of typing is the following. 
We start by introducing infinitely many truth predicates T1, T2, T3… to the language 
of the base theory !. The idea is that ℒ! ∪ {T1} is ℒ!T1, ℒ! ∪ {T1, T2} is ℒ!T1T2, and 
so on. For each new language ℒ!T1…Tm we have a new restricted version of the T-
schema, so that for each n such that m ≥ n > 0, Tn ⌜ϕ⌝ ↔ ϕ holds if and only if ϕ 
contains no occurrences of Tj, for m ≥ j ≥ n. The resulting language is ℒ!Tω, that is, ℒ! 
∪ {T1, T2, T3,…}.6 The resulting theory has, for each n > 0, a restricted T-schema for 
Tn. More formally, for each n > 0 the following holds: 
(Restricted T-Schema) Tn ⌜ϕ⌝ ↔ ϕ    where ϕ does not contain occurrences  
          of Tm for m ≥ n.  
It will be useful to have a definition of the type of a formula. I will say that (for m > 0) 
the truth-type τ(ϕ) of a formula ϕ is m, more formally, τ(ϕ) = m, if ϕ contains an oc-
currence of Tm and for every n > m, ϕ does not contain any occurrence of Tn, other-
wise, τ(ϕ) = 0. Of course, for every formula ϕ ∈ ℒ!, τ(ϕ) = 0.  
 It should be clear that a liar sentence, for example, is no longer an instance of the 
Restricted T-schema because in  
Tm ⌜ϕ⌝ ↔ ϕ          where τ(ϕ) < m 
we cannot replace ϕ by the formula ¬Tm ⌜A⌝ without violating a type restriction. We 
can replace it by ¬Tn ⌜A⌝ if m > n, thus obtaining 
Tm ⌜¬Tn ⌜A⌝⌝ ↔ ¬Tn ⌜A⌝.   
But this will not generate a contradiction.  
                                                      
5 Curiously, this kind of solution was anticipated by Alonzo Church in an anonymous referee report to 
Fitch’s article where the Knowability Argument first appeared. The reader can see (Salerno 2009) for 
the details.    
6 Of course, the hierarchy of truth predicates could continue at transfinite levels, but to simplify things I 
will not consider this possibility here. 
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 The similarities between the concept of truth and other concepts like necessity and 
knowledge is usually overlooked. The reaction of the philosophical community to-
wards the Liar paradox is very different from its reaction towards modal Liar-like par-
adoxes such as the Knower. Regarding the first one, many different solutions have 
been proposed: disallowing self-reference, modifying classical logic, using revision se-
quences, among other things. Concerning the others, the traditional reaction is to treat 
the corresponding notions as operators instead of treating them as predicates. This 
difference in attitude might seem strange since it is perfectly possible to use the other 
strategies (banning self-reference, dropping classical logic, etc.) to solve the modal 
paradoxes. So the question we must ask becomes clear: why is it so common (nowa-
days) to treat modalities as operators instead of treating them as predicates? The an-
swer can probably be found in (Montague 1963). Montague proves a version of the 
following theorem:   
(Theorem 1)  Let ! be a theory that extends Robinson’s Arithmetic Q7 and let P(x) 
be a monadic predicate of ℒ!%(the language in which the theory ! is 
formulated). If P(x) satisfies (P-fact) and (P-nec), then ! is incon-
sistent.  
(P-fact) P ⌜ϕ⌝ → ϕ     
(P-nec) If ⊦!%ϕ, then ⊦! P ⌜ϕ⌝%       
The proof is very simple. Informally, it is enough to consider the following instance of 
the Diagonal Lemma: A ↔ ¬P ⌜A⌝. Assume that P ⌜A⌝ holds. By (P-fact), we ob-
tain A and using the biconditional above we infer ¬P ⌜A⌝. By reductio, we have ¬P ⌜A⌝, which is equivalent to A. If we apply (P-nec) to A we obtain P ⌜A⌝. So we 
have a contradiction. This proof is quite general. It applies to every predicate satisfying 
Factivity and Necessitation. Two prominent examples are the knowledge and the ne-
cessity predicates.  
 For a long time the philosophical community took this result as conclusive evi-
dence that modalities must be treated as operators and not as predicates. For instance, 
Montague claims that “(…) if necessity is to be treated syntactically, that is, as a predi-
cate of sentences (…) then virtually all of modal logic (…) is to be sacrificed” (1963, 
294). 
 The comparison with the concept of truth motivates the following question: why 
can’t we avoid modal paradoxes by modifying some of the principles that govern the 
modal predicates? One traditional reaction to the Liar (and related semantic paradoxes 
like the Curry paradox) is to restrict self-reference by adopting a type-theoretic frame-
work. This approach is very effective when it comes to blocking the usual semantic 
inconsistencies.8 
                                                      
7 Or any theory in which the Diagonal Lemma holds.   
8 Of course, there are reasons to question the adequacy of such an approach. These reasons are usually 
related either to the unnaturalness of the types or to the expressive and proof-theoretic weakness of 
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 So nothing prevents us from doing the same with the modal notions understood as 
predicates. Let P1, P2, P3,… be modal predicates such that a formula ϕ has P-type m, 
that is, π(ϕ) = m if it has an occurrence of Pm and for any n > m, it has no occurrences 
of Pn. Otherwise, π(ϕ) = 0. One possible way to implement the type restrictions for 
formulas containing Pi is to regard as legitimate only certain instances of Factivity and 
Necessitation for Pi:   
(Restricted P-fact)   Pm ⌜ϕ⌝ → ϕ      where π(ϕ) < m. 
(Restricted P-nec)   If ├%! ϕ, then ├%!%Pm ⌜ϕ⌝    where π(ϕ) < m. 
Under these conditions, Montague’s paradox no longer arises.  
 Also, the Knowability Argument is no longer available. If we try to mimic the 
proof presented at the beginning, in virtue of the type restrictions for knowledge we 
would only have something like 
Km ⌜ϕ ∧ ¬Kn ⌜ϕ⌝ ⌝  →  (Km ⌜ϕ⌝%∧ Km ⌜¬Kn ⌜ϕ⌝⌝)9  
where κ(ϕ) < n < m  and where κ(ϕ) stands for the knowledge-type of the formula ϕ. 
From this, we can infer 
Km ⌜ϕ ∧ ¬Kn ⌜ϕ⌝ ⌝  →  (Km ⌜ϕ⌝ ∧ ¬Kn ⌜ϕ⌝) 
But the consequent is far from being a contradiction. We can obtain a contradiction if 
the following principle holds:  
Km ⌜ϕ⌝ → Kn ⌜ϕ⌝     for every m, n such that κ(ϕ) < n < m.    
But those who favor a typed theory of knowledge have reasons to reject it. Hence the 
Knowability Argument is blocked. 
3. A new paradox  
One recent defense of this approach has been provided by Alexander Paseau (cf. 2008 
and 2009). He claims that the following principle fails if P(x) represents knowledge:  
(Minimality P)  For any n > π (ϕ), if Pn ⌜ϕ⌝, then Pπ(ϕ)+1 ⌜ϕ⌝.   
Paseau provides an independent conceptual motivation for thinking that this principle 
fails. The types are supposed to represent the way in which a particular proposition 
has come to be known by an agent. In Paseau’s words: “the typing is one of epistemic 
access rather than (just) content” (2008, 163). For example, if A is a sentence and 
κ(A)=0, then, if the state of affairs depicted by A is known by an agent through per-
                                                                                                                                         
the resulting theory. Below I will explore some additional complications that arise when the 
knowledge predicate is typed.  
9 If we employ a typed language where only formulas of the form Kκ(ϕ)+1 ⌜ϕ⌝ are permitted, the paradox 
will be blocked as well because from the assumption Kκ(ϕ)+2 ⌜ϕ ∧ ¬Kκ(ϕ)+1 ⌜ϕ⌝⌝ we cannot infer 
Kκ(ϕ)+2 ⌜ϕ⌝ ∧ Kκ(ϕ)+2 ⌜¬Kκ(ϕ)+1 ⌜ϕ⌝⌝ since the first conjunct is not well formed.  A careful examinat- 
 ion of this strategy is beyond the scope of this paper. Let me just say that I have qualms about this 
way of implementing the type restrictions. In particular, the resulting language is expressively weak 
and reasonable instances of Distribution, like the one above, are not validated.      
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ceptual means, we might say that the agent has type 1 knowledge of A, that is, the sen-
tence K1 ⌜A⌝ is true. However, not every state of affairs depicted by a type 0 sentence 
can be known in this way. Think of a sentence B such that we do not have (and can-
not have) perceptual access to the state of affairs depicted by it and such that B is only 
known indirectly through our knowledge of other states of affairs depicted the sen-
tences C and D. Then we could say that we have type 2 (or maybe type 3) knowledge 
of B, that is, the sentence K2 ⌜B⌝ would be true but the sentence K1 ⌜B⌝ would be 
false. The following example is provided by Paseau: “I know2 that Giggs scored the 
winning penalty in the 2008 Champions League final if I infer it from the facts that 
you know1 that it was either Giggs or Ronaldo, and that Ronaldo missed his penalty” 
(2009, 284). Also Linsky subscribes to a similar line of reasoning: “We need not in 
general accept the principle K2p → K1p. (…) Think of an (…) agent developing be-
liefs in order (…). There is no reason to believe that (…) what is known at a higher 
level must be known at lower levels. (…) What is known is frequently a function of 
other beliefs and knowledge” (2009, 172).  
 In Paseau’s proposal K and □ are treated as predicates. This has some advantages. 
First, treating the modalities as predicates has the virtue of increasing the expressive 
capacity of the language. We can assert non-schematic generalizations such as  
∀x∀y (K(x) & K (x → y) → K(y)) and  
∃x K(x),10 
to give a couple of examples, that would only be expressible by the schemas 
K(ϕ) & K(ϕ → ψ) → K(ψ) and 
Kϕ for some ϕ 
if knowledge were an operator (unless we were willing to admit quantification over 
propositions).11 Second, we can construct self-referential sentences in the well-studied 
framework of arithmetic using the Diagonal Lemma. This is a virtue at least to the ex-
tent that we expect our theories to prove all sorts of truths, even truths about their 
own sentences.12  
 Naturally, the presence of the Diagonal Lemma implies that the risk of generating 
an inconsistency is very high. In particular, it is not difficult to think of problematic 
instances of the Lemma in which two modalities are combined. For example, consider 
the sentence ‘This sentence is not knowable’ or the sentence ‘If this sentence is know-
                                                      
10 Again, I am being sloppy with the notation. The possible values of x are restricted to (names of) sen-
tences in both cases, and the conditional occurring in the scope of the knowledge predicate is a func-
tion rather than the actual connective.   
11 But adopting quantification over propositions is all but innocent. For one thing, it amounts to accept-
ing a form of second-order quantification. For another, we would be stuck (without any real need) 
with two sort of quantifiers: the usual first-order objectual ones, and the new propositional quantifi-
ers, which are usually substitutionally interpreted.     
12 Paseau also offers a very sophisticated semantic framework showing that the typed Knowability Princi-
ple is valid while the claim that every truth is known is invalid. This shows that the Knowability Ar-
gument is blocked in his framework.     
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able, then ⊥’, which are modal-epistemic versions of the Liar and the Curry sentence, 
respectively. Halbach (2008) has shown that because of sentences like these, it is not 
enough to type the language in the way explained above: 
(Theorem 2) Let ! be a theory that extends Q and let □m(x) and Kn(x) be predi-
cates of ℒ!. If □m(x) and Kn(x) satisfy (Restricted K-fact), (Restricted 
□-nec) and (Restricted KP), then ! is inconsistent.  
(Restricted K-fact)   Kn ⌜ϕ⌝ → ϕ      where κ(ϕ) < n. 
(Restricted □-nec)   If ⊦%!%ϕ, then ⊦!%□m ⌜ϕ⌝      where η(ϕ) < m13 
(Restricted KP)    ϕ → ◊m ⌜Kn ⌜ϕ⌝⌝    where κ(ϕ) < n.   
Proof: By the Diagonal Lemma, which is provable !, we know that ⊦! A ↔ 
□m⌜¬Kn⌜A⌝⌝.14 Since κ(A) < n, by (Restricted KP) we have ⊦! A → ◊m⌜Kn⌜A⌝⌝. 
So logic alone gives us ⊦! ¬A. Since we also have (Restricted K-fact), we can obtain ⊦! ¬Kn⌜A⌝, given again that κ(A) < n. But using (Restricted □-nec) together with the 
fact that η(¬Kn⌜A⌝) < m, we get ⊦! □m⌜¬Kn⌜A⌝⌝, which yields ⊦! A. So ! is in-
consistent.  
 As we have seen, the Knowability Principle is highly controversial because it leads 
to an inconsistency. The surprising aspect of Halbach’s proof is that a contradiction is 
obtainable even from a type-restricted version of the Knowability Principle (and other 
restricted modal principles). So Halbach’s proof is an argument against the idea of 
blocking the Knowability Argument by appealing to types. 
 There are a few details in Halbach’s proof that deserve mentioning. One thing is 
that the knowledge-types (κ) and the possibility-types (η) do not interact. Of course, it 
would be too extreme to ban all interactions of knowledge with possibility, since in 
order to express the Knowability Principle the type-theorist needs formulas where 
these two predicates are combined. Also, there is prima facie nothing wrong with sen-
tences of the form ◊m⌜Kn ⌜ϕ⌝⌝ where the possibility-type m is smaller than the 
knowledge-type n. The rules above do not ban constructions of this sort.15 A second 
noticeable feature of the proof is that it uses the fact that (Restricted KP) imposes no 
restriction concerning the appearance of ◊m (and □m) in ϕ. It is only asked that ϕ con-
tains no occurrences of Kn.      
 The type-theorist has, as far as I can see, at least three ways to avoid Halbach’s ob-
jection without losing the expressive power gained by treating knowledge and necessi-
ty as predicates:  
                                                      
13 η(ϕ) stands for the necessity(possibility)-type of the formula ϕ.  
14 The fact that ⊦! A ↔ □m ⌜¬Kn ⌜A⌝⌝ means that A is the sentence ∃x(x = ⌜A⌝ ∧ □m(⌜Kn (x)⌝ )). 
So κ(¬Kn ⌜A⌝) = n and η(A) = m, but since the predicate Kn occurs in A only as part of a name, 
κ(A) = η(¬Kn ⌜A⌝) = 0.   
15 Although it could be argued that they should. I will deal with this objection later.  
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• Applying a stronger type restriction on the Knowability Principle.  
• Introducing cross-hierarchy type restrictions. 
• Using truth to emulate the knowledge and necessity.   
I will argue that only the third option is attractive. I will also argue that this has two 
consequences. First, it implies that there are no good reasons to type knowledge and 
necessity, and second, that either the Knowability Argument is sound or it must be 
blocked without resorting to type restrictions. 
4. Weakening the Knowability Principle 
Paseau claims that one way to avoid Halbach’s proof is to further weaken the Knowa-
bility Principle. The idea is to adopt the following weak version of Knowability:  
(Restricted KP*)  ϕ → ◊m ⌜Kn ⌜ϕ⌝⌝    for some n ≥ κ(ϕ)16 
The difference with the previous version of Knowability is that something, say A, can 
be knowable at type κ(A)+n without being knowable at type κ(A)+1, where n > 1.  
 I claim that the restriction imposed on the Knowability Principe is problematic 
and, more importantly, not strong enough to block certain paradoxes. First of all, (Re-
stricted KP*) quantifies (apparently in an unrestricted way) over types. So the type-
theorist needs to slip in type quantifiers into the language. Otherwise, the Knowability 
Principle is not even expressible. It is clear, though, that if quantification over the type 
hierarchy is admissible, then the language is capable of making problematic general 
claims such as “For every knowledge-type x greater than κ(A), Kx ⌜A⌝”, “A ∧ for no 
knowledge-type x greater than κ(A), Kx ⌜A⌝”, and “For some knowledge-type x 
greater than κ(A), Kx ⌜A ∧ B⌝”.  
 But what is the knowledge-type of these assertions? And, more prominently, what 
is the knowledge-type of the (Restricted KP*) itself? The type-theorist could argue 
that not every formula has a knowledge-type. A possible way to implement this idea is 
to define the type function κ as a partial function, thus allowing for quantifications 
over knowledge-types while avoiding the problem of assigning a type to those formu-
las that unboundedly quantify over types.   
 However, if quantification over knowledge-types is admissible, a contradiction is 
still obtainable with (Restricted KP*) provided that the formulas in which the 
knowledge-type quantifiers appear have no specific knowledge-type and that the re-
stricted Factivity principle introduced above is applicable to these formulas. In other 
words, we have the following result 
 
 
 
                                                      
16 Sometimes Paseau uses operators for knowledge and possibility, and sometimes he uses operators. To 
keep things uniform with the rest of the paper, I will use typed predicates for both possibility (neces-
sity) and knowledge. 
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(Theorem 3)  Let ! be a theory that extends Q and let □m(x) and Kn(x) be predi-
cates of ℒ!. Assume that ℒ! can quantify over types, i.e., ℒ! has ex-
pressions of the form “for every/some knowledge type x” and “for 
every/some necessity type x”. If □m(x) y Kn(x) satisfy (Restricted K-
fact*), (Restricted  □-nec*) and (Restricted KP*), then ! is incon-
sistent.  
(Restricted  □-nec*)  If ├%! ϕ, then ├%!%%□m⌜ϕ⌝     where η(ϕ) < m or ϕ has  
             no knowledge-type. 
(Restricted K-fact*)  Km⌜ϕ⌝ → ϕ     where κ(ϕ) < m or ϕ has  
             no knowledge-type.17 
Proof: The idea behind the proof is to run a usual diagonal argument using the sen-
tence that says of itself that it is unknowable at every knowledge-type. So if%!%proves 
the Diagonal Lemma, then ├%!%A ↔ for every x > κ(A), ¬◊m ⌜Kx ⌜A⌝⌝. Also, by 
(Restricted KP*), we have ├%!%For some x > κ(A), A → ◊m ⌜Kx ⌜A⌝⌝. From these 
two facts, logical reasoning within ! gives us ├!%¬A. By (Restricted K-fact*) we know 
that├!% For every x > κ(A), Kx ⌜A⌝ → A. This means that we can infer                      ├%!%¬Kκ(A)+n ⌜A⌝. Using (Restricted □-nec*), we can obtain├%! □m⌜¬Kκ(A)+n⌜A⌝⌝, 
which is equivalent to the right hand side of the biconditional above. So we also have ├%!%A. Hence, ! is inconsistent.18 
 But is the quantification over types something the type-theorist would accept? 
Well, remember that in order to express (Restricted KP*) (as presented by Paseau) we 
must quantify over types19. The type-theorist could reply that it is possible to dispose 
of the quantifier if (Restricted KP*) is understood as a schema, i.e., if some instances of 
the Knowability Principle are taken as axioms. However, this move is only available 
for the first version of the Knowability Principle, not for (Restricted KP*). Recall that 
this principle involves an existential quantification over types. We do not know which 
instances of n should be taken as axioms.  
                                                      
17 It would be pointless for the advocate of the Knowability Principle to question the idea that the 
knowledge predicate applies to formulas of the form “For every knowledge-type x, …” or “For some 
knowledge-type x,…” once they have accepted them as part of the language. If no knowledge predi-
cate were applicable to this sort of sentences, there would automatically be unknowable sentences in 
the language. The advocate of the Knowability Principle certainly does not want that.    
18 Notice that in order to obtain an unpleasant result a diagonal argument is not really necessary here. We 
could use a Fitch-style reasoning giving us the conclusion that if every truth is knowable at some type, 
then every truth is known at some type, a result that seems quite unreasonable. The argument is briefly 
sketched in (Hart 2009). 
19 A similar point is made by (Carrara and Fassio 2011, 187-88) about the Non-Omniscience Principle.  
Intuitively, the occurrence of the knowledge predicate (operator) in this claim seems to be type-
unrestricted. So in order to express it in a type-theoretic framework, we would need to quantify over 
types: ϕ ∧ for some x > κ(ϕ), ¬Kx ⌜ϕ⌝.    
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 To deal with this issue, Paseau (2009, 285) tentatively proposes to introduce a 
knowability function k, which applies to a sentence and outputs the type at which the 
sentence is first knowable.  He suggests that the type-theorist can endorse the schema 
ϕ → ◊Kk(ϕ)ϕ and notes that we cannot resurrect Halbach’s diagonal argument using    
γ ↔ ¬◊ ⌜Kk(γ) ⌜γ⌝⌝. For to run the diagonal argument, we first fix an n and then     
diagonalize on the predicate ¬◊ ⌜Kn(x)⌝ obtaining γ ↔ ¬◊ ⌜Kn ⌜γ⌝⌝ for some sen-
tence γ. But this γ is such that k(γ) ≠ n.  
 However, it is unclear to me whether this version of the Knowability Principle is 
an improvement over the existential version. The knowledge-types are supposed to 
represent the way in which a particular proposition has come to be known by an 
agent, so it seems that to calculate the output of the function for a certain input   
some empirical  information is needed.  Hence,  we  only find out what  the admissible 
instances of  ϕ → ◊Kk(ϕ) ϕ are by doing empirical research.  This option does not seem 
to be very attractive.   
 Moreover, even if this version of the Knowability Principle could be defended 
somehow, it would be strange for the supporter of the syntactic approach to reject the 
use of quantifications given that she has already presented reasons for preferring them 
over schemata. One of the main advantages of treating knowledge as a predicate in-
stead of treating it as an operator is that we can replace schemas with quantifications. 
So either quantification over types is admissible and the previous proofs are legitimate, 
or quantification over types is not admissible and the Knowability Principle cannot be 
adequately expressed.   
5. Generalizing Halbach’s argument and applying cross-hierarchy type restrictions 
At least prima facie Halbach’s proof only has an impact on philosophers who are keen 
on the Knowability Principle. Thus, a natural reaction for someone who advocates the 
project of representing modalities as predicates is simply to reject this principle (even 
in its restricted version). So, when things are put this way, Halbach’s proof can be seen 
as just one more reason to reject the claim that every truth is knowable. However, it 
can be shown (Paseau 2009) that a different proof can be constructed without the 
Knowability Principle, even in its weak version. 
(Theorem 4)   Let ! be a theory that extends Q and let □m(x) and Kn(x) be       
predicates of ℒ!. If (Restricted K-fact), (Restricted □-fact),           
(Restricted □-nec) and (Restricted K-nec) hold, then ! is incon-
sistent. 
Proof: Since ! proves the Diagonal Lemma we have ├% ! A ↔ □m ⌜¬Kn ⌜A⌝⌝.    
But since (Restricted K-fact) and (Restricted □-fact) both hold, we can infer that              ├% ! Kn ⌜A⌝ → ¬Kn ⌜A⌝. This in turn gives us ├% ! ¬Kn ⌜A⌝. Using                      
(Restricted □-nec) we obtain ├% !%□m ⌜¬Kn ⌜A⌝⌝. By the biconditional above and  
(Restricted K-nec), we can prove ├%%%! Kn⌜A⌝. Hence%! is inconsistent.           
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 As a matter of fact, a more general version of this holds. The inconsistency might 
be viewed as emerging from the interaction of any two (or more) predicates satisfying 
restricted versions of Factivity and Necessitation. More rigorously, if ! is a theory that 
extends Q and P1(x), ... , Pn(x) are unary predicates satisfying Restricted Factivity and 
Restricted Necessitation, then ! is inconsistent. The proof is similar to the previous 
one. The idea is just to apply Necessitation and Factivity as much times as                  
it takes to the following multimodal instance of the Diagonal Lemma                         
A ↔ ¬Pn ⌜… ⌜P2 ⌜P1 ⌜A⌝ ⌝ ⌝%…⌝.    
 However, as we will shortly see, using the existence of multimodal paradoxes to 
argue that the Knowability Principle is innocent is not the right dialectical move for 
the type-theorist. Even if she has shown that the previous paradox (the one in       
Theorem 4) makes no use of the Knowability Principle, it is still a paradox that affects 
her way of conceiving knowledge and necessity. The point is that in order to deal with 
this paradox, the type-theorist might want to make the necessity(possibility)-types η 
interact with the knowledge types κ, claiming that it is strange to have different and 
isolated hierarchies for knowledge and necessity (possibility).  
 As a matter of fact, Paseau argues that “it is natural to assume [that] there are such 
restrictions” (2009, 282). Unfortunately, it is important to notice that nothing of what 
was said to justify the typing of the knowledge predicate seems to apply to possibility 
or necessity. Moreover, there is no non-ad hoc reason to think that the necessity-types 
are somehow related to the knowledge-types. The idea that the knowledge types rep-
resent the way in which knowledge is acquired by an agent cannot be transferred to 
the alethic modalities. It makes no sense to talk about “the way in which necessity is 
acquired by an agent” or “the way in which something has become necessary”. So, in 
the case of necessity (possibility), the types, if there are any, should be introduced for 
different reasons. 
 In any case, as we said before, it would be too extreme to ban all interactions be-
tween predicates. One way of setting up some restrictions without banning all interac-
tions is by linearly ordering the predicates. We sequentially introduce infinitely many 
predicates P1, P2, P3, … to the language of the base theory !. The idea is that ℒ! ∪ 
{P1} is ℒ!%P1, ℒ! ∪ {P1, P2} is ℒ!%P1 P2, and so on. For each new language ℒ!%P1…Pn we 
have new restricted principles for P. The resulting language is ℒ!%Pω , that is, ℒ! ∪ {P1, 
P2, P3, …}.20 The resulting theory !Pω has, for each n > 0, restricted versions P-fact 
and P-necessitation for each Pn. More formally, for each n > 0, the following holds: 
(Pn-fact*) %⊦! Pn ⌜ϕ⌝ → ϕ        for each ϕ ∈ ℒ!%P1, …, Pn-1  
(Pn-nec*)  If ⊦! ϕ, then ⊦! Pn ⌜ϕ⌝    for each ϕ ∈ ℒ!%P1, …, Pn-1. 
If the typed predicates are introduced in this way, it is no longer possible to obtain a 
contradiction.   
 It is straightforward to check that all the proofs given above can be blocked if 
cross-hierarchy restrictions are set up in this way. Technically this solution works   
                                                      
20 Again, it is clear that the hierarchy of predicates could continue at transfinite levels.  
The Knowability Argument and the Syntactic Type-Theoretic Approach 
Theoria 80 (2014): 201-221 
213 
perfectly. Both the one-predicate paradoxes and the multimodal paradoxes are avoid-
ed. Conceptually, however, it is not easy to adequately motivate the order in which the 
different predicates are introduced. To see why, consider again truth, necessity and 
knowledge. To make sure that the combination of these notions does not generate 
paradoxes, we sequentially introduce infinitely many truth predicates, necessity predi-
cates and knowledge predicates. But it is not clear how the different predicates are to 
be introduced. We could order the predicates like this T1, □2, K3, T4, □5, K6, … or we 
could order them like this □1, K2, T3, □4, K5, T6, … or we could order them like this 
K1, T 2, □3, K4, T5, □6, … or … . We could even have three sequences, T1, T2, T3, … 
□1, □2, □3, … K1, K2, K3, and still other less natural orders could be chosen. There is 
no good reason to prefer one order over another. In other words, there are infinitely 
many ways of linearly ordering the predicates, but they are all equally unmotivated and 
artificial. 
 The previous remarks are only tentative. As expected, I do not have a conclusive 
argument against all possible ways in which necessity, knowledge and other notions 
could be simultaneously typed21. But it is important to point out what the dialectical 
situation is concerning the introduction of types when several notions are involved. 
Since the most natural ways of typing are not available, it seems that the burden of the 
proof is with the type theorist.  
6. Using truth to emulate knowledge and necessity 
As we said at the beginning, type-theoretic approaches are tempting because they  
provide a unified solution to many paradoxes. However, it is not always a good thing 
to have a unified response to very different kinds of phenomena. It is usually 
acknowledged that whenever we face the same kind of paradox, we should provide 
the same kind of solution. But are the Liar paradox, Montague’s paradox, the self-
referential multimodal paradoxes and so on, of the same kind as the Knowability   
Paradox (if indeed the Knowability Argument is a paradox)? There are a number of is-
sues that need to be addressed before answering this question. For example, what 
does it mean to be of the same kind, what is the level of abstraction we are dealing 
with, etc. In any case, what I want to claim here is just that the best solution the type-
theorist has to deal with multimodal paradoxes leaves the Knowability Argument un-
touched, and that that is as it should be, since it is reasonable to say that the Knowa-
bility Argument is not a genuine paradox, or at least that it is not of the same kind as 
the Liar and other self-referential paradoxes.22  
                                                      
21 There might be a reasonable way of partially ordering the predicates. For example, it will work to have 
predicates Tn, □n and Kn, with axioms and rules (Tn-schema**), (□n-fact**), (Kn-fact**), (□n-nec**), 
(Kn-nec**), and so on, such that for instance (□n-fact**) says that □n ϕ → ϕ is an axiom if ϕ does 
not contain occurrences of Tm, □m or Km for m ≥ n. However, it remains unclear what the conceptual 
motivation is for this sort of typing. For a detailed discussion see (Pailos and Rosenblatt 2013).    
22 Although see (Priest 2009) for an argument to the effect that the Knowability Paradox (just like Rus-
sell’s paradox, the Liar paradox, and so on) fits his Inclosure schema.  
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 The sort of approach that I am about to put forward is not really new. Some phi-
losophers have explicitly or implicitly endorsed it.23 My point is merely to stress that 
the approach provides the type-theorist with the tools she needs to address  multi-
modal paradoxes while not messing with the Knowability Argument. The idea is that 
instead of representing a certain notion by a predicate P, we represent it by OT, where 
O is the operator that corresponds to the predicate P and T is the truth predicate. I do 
not claim that OT expresses exactly the same concept that the operator O is supposed 
to express. It is enough for what I want that OT behaves similarly enough to the   
modality expressed by the operator O, and that it avoids the same problems (i.e. para-
doxes). In particular, I do not want to subscribe to the idea that OT has the same 
meaning as O. So, in this proposal truth is treated as a predicate but all the other no-
tions are treated as operators (as is usually done).24 
 If this could be generalized, we would have for every operator O a corresponding 
predicate of the form OT ⌜ϕ⌝. In particular, if O is □ we can think of the predicate  
□  T(x) as capturing the concept of necessity and if O is K we can think of the predi-
cate KT(x) as capturing the concept of knowledge. One might think it is unnatural to 
replace occurrences of P, whatever that is, by occurrences of the complex expression 
OT. But natural languages allow for paraphrases of this kind. For instance, if P is the 
necessity predicate or the knowledge predicate, it seems plausible to paraphrase sen-
tences like ‘2+2=4 is necessary’ and ‘2+2=4 is known’ by ‘2+2=4 is necessarily true’ 
and ‘2+2=4 is known to be true’, respectively. 
 The main advantage of this approach is that even if some notions are treated as 
operators, no expressive power is lost as long as the expressions of the form OT are 
properly understood25. For example, the claim that every arithmetical truth is neces-
sary can be expressed by means of a predicate of the form □  T(x), and becomes the 
claim that every arithmetical truth is necessarily true.  
 What about multimodal paradoxes? Since the language includes the truth predicate, 
we need principles for it. Now, whatever the best theory of truth is, by Tarski´s Theo-
rem we know that it will not have the full T-schema.26 But in order to infer a contra-
                                                      
23 See (Halbach and Welch 2009) and (Horsten 2009).  
24 I am not completely sure that the ‘all’ in the previous sentence should be understood unrestrictedly. 
For example, maybe the notions of (non-idealized) belief and logical validity could be treated as pred-
icates (together with the truth predicate) without generating an inconsistency. It all depends, of 
course, on the principles governing the corresponding notion.    
25 This idea was sketched by Kripke in his classic paper on truth (Kripke 1975). A similar proposal has 
been advanced more recently in (Halbach and Welch 2009) at least regarding truth and necessity. 
However there are at least two differences. First, their aim is different from mine. They are not im-
mediately concerned with multimodal paradoxes but with the possibility of having an expressively 
rich language in which modal notions are treated as operators. Second, they offer a semantic account 
in which the meaning of the connectives is given by Strong Kleene logic and the meaning of the truth 
predicate is given by Kripke’s minimal fixed point construction. I will do something different. I will 
present a classical axiomatic theory in which there are type restrictions for truth.       
26 Unless, of course, we make substantial revisions on classical logic. However, discussing such theories is 
well beyond the scope of this paper.    
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diction from a self-referential multimodal sentence we must have, in addition to the 
rules for the modal operators, an untyped version of the T-schema. In other words, if 
the truth predicate only satisfies (Restricted T-schema), then clearly the multimodal 
paradoxes will no longer be a problem.  
7. A simple theory  
To illustrate how my solution to the multimodal paradoxes works and how the 
Knowability Argument is preserved, I will present a formal theory in which truth, ne-
cessity and knowledge can be represented. Naturally, the solution is meant to be more 
general, and as a matter of fact other notions could be introduced to the theory. How-
ever, for the purpose of illustrating my position, I think the theory I am about to offer 
is interesting enough.  
 Let ! be a theory expressed in a first-order language ℒ extending Peano Arithme-
tic. We stipulate that in addition to having the usual non-logical symbols of arithmetic 
the language ℒ has finitely many new individual constants, functions symbols and predi-
cates.27 Let ℒ□K be the language that results from adding the necessity operator □ and 
the knowledge operator K to ℒ. Of course, we assume that ℒ□K contains names for 
each of its expressions, including terms, sentences and formulas (even those          
containing K and □) and we also assume that we have some appropriate form of   
coding for the expressions of the language such that ⌜e⌝ is the name of (the code of) 
the expression e (under this coding). Let !□% K be the theory that results from adding 
the following axioms and rules to !: 
(□-fact) □ϕ → ϕ   
(□-nec)  If ⊦!□ K ϕ, then ⊦!□ K □ϕ 
(□-dist) □ (ϕ → ψ) → (□ϕ → □ψ) 
(□-trans) □ϕ → □□ϕ 
(□-Barcan) ∀x□ϕ(x) → □∀xϕ(x) 
(□-ineq) t1 ≠ t2 → □ (t1 ≠ t2)      for rigid terms t1 and t228 
(K-fact) Kϕ → ϕ      
(K-nec) If ⊦!□K ϕ, then ⊦!□K Kϕ 
(K-dist) K(ϕ → ψ) → (Kϕ → Kψ) 
(K-Barcan)  ∀xKϕ(x) → K∀xϕ(x) 
(K-ineq) t1 ≠ t2 → K(t1 ≠ t2)      for rigid terms t1 and t2 
                                                      
27 Since the whole point of the construction is to add modal operators to the language, we need to add re-
sources to construct contingent sentences. Otherwise, the modal operators will collapse with truth.  
28 We say that a term t is rigid if and only if the denotation of t is the same at every world.  
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 In other words, the theory !□K has an S4-notion of necessity and a T-notion of 
knowledge.29 The theory can be interpreted as usual. Consider a Kripke frame           ℱ = <W, R□, RK> such that W is a set of worlds, R□ is a reflexive and transitive rela-
tion on W and RK is a reflexive relation on W. To avoid unnecessary complications 
and, more specifically, to simplify the interpretations, we are going to make three stip-
ulations. First, we assume that the domain D is the same in every world (this is why 
the Barcan Formula is one of the axioms above). Second, each individual constant de-
notes the same object in every world. So the only changes between worlds have to do 
with the interpretation of (some of) the function symbols and (some of) the predi-
cates.30 Third, the language has enough names for the objects in D. So we can develop 
the semantics for the quantifiers substitutionally.31  
 It is not hard to show that we can use this frame ℱ to build a model ℳ based on ℱ for !□K. The models for !□K are of the form <W, R□, RK, I!> where W, R□ and RK 
are as before and I! is a function that assigns in each world ! ∈ W an object cℳ in D 
to each individual constant c, a function fℳ from Dk to D to each k-ary function  
symbol f, and a relation rℳ in Dk to each k-ary relation symbol r. We can define an   
assignment of truth values to the formulas of ℒ□K relative to a model ℳ and a world ! as follows:  
(ℳ, !) ⊨ r(t1,…,tk) if and only if <I!(t1),…,I!(tk)> ∈ I!(r)    
(ℳ, !) ⊨ ¬ϕ if and only if (ℳ, !) ⊭ ϕ 
(ℳ, !) ⊨ ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 if and only if (ℳ, !) ⊨ ϕ1 and (ℳ, !) ⊨ ϕ2 
(ℳ, !) ⊨ ∃xϕ if and only if (ℳ, !) ⊨ ϕ[x/t] for some term t of ℒ□K   
(ℳ, !) ⊨ □ϕ if and only if (∀!%%∈ W)(!R□!%→ (ℳ, !) ⊨ ϕ)    
(ℳ, !) ⊨ Kϕ if and only if (∀!%∈ W)(!RK! → (ℳ, !) ⊨ ϕ)   
 It can be shown that there are assignments of truth values that make all the axioms 
and rules for K and □ true. As a matter of fact, any model%ℳ%based on the frame ℱ 
with the features mentioned above will make all these principles true and all the rules 
valid.32 So far, so good.  
                                                      
29 There is nothing special about this particular choice of axioms, except that they keep the construction 
of models for the theory simple. In fact, some of the axioms seem quite controversial. For example, 
the axiom (K-ineq) requires that the agent be not only logically omniscient but also that she knows 
every true inequality. In any case, if the reader has other notions of necessity and knowledge in mind, 
a different set of axioms could be chosen. 
30 Some function symbols (such as successor, addition and multiplication) will of course denote the same 
function in every world.  
31 Nothing crucial depends on these simplifications. They just make the construction of models for the 
theory much easier.  
32 Actually things are not so simple. Since we have non-rigid terms in the language, some first order prin-
ciples must be restricted. In particular,  
(i) ϕ(t) → ∃xϕ(x)  
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 The difficult part is to add a truth predicate (or a sequence T1, T2, T3, … of truth 
predicates) to ℒ□K and principles for truth to !□K. Let ℒ□K T1(x) be the language that re-
sults from adding the truth predicate T1 to ℒ□K, ℒ□K T2(x) the language that results from 
adding the truth predicate T2 to ℒ□K T1(x) and so on. Finally, let ℒ□K Tω(x) be the language 
that results from adding the sequence of truth predicates T1, T2, T3, … to ℒ□K. Simi-
larly, let !□K Tω(x) be the theory that results from adding the following axioms to !□K 
for each n ∈ ω and for each predicate r of ℒ□K Tω(x): 
(Atn+1)  ∀t1,...,∀tk(Sentℒ□K Tn(x)(r(t1,…,tk)) → (Tn+1(r(t1,…,tk))  
 ↔ r(val!(t1),…,val!(tk))))33   
(Comp¬n+1) ∀y(Sentℒ□K Tn(x)(y) → (Tn+1(¬y) ↔ ¬Tn+1(y))) 
(Comp∧n+1) ∀y∀z(Sentℒ□K Tn(x)(y∧z) → (Tn+1(y∧z) ↔ Tn+1(y) ∧ Tn+1(z))) 
(Comp∃n+1) ∀v∀y(Sentℒ□K Tn(x)(∃vy) → (Tn+1(∃vy) ↔ ∃t(Tn+1(y(t/v)))))34 
(□Tn+1) ∀y(Sentℒ□K Tn(x)(y) → (Tn+1(□y) ↔ □Tn+1(y)))  
(KTn+1) ∀y(SentL□K Tn(x)(y) → (Tn+1(Ky) ↔ KTn+1(y)) 
(TTn+1) ∀t(Sentℒ□K Tj-1(x)(val!(t)) → (Tn+1(Tj(t)) ↔ Tn+1(val!(t))))    
                  for each j ≤ n35 
 The predicate Sentℒ□K Tn(x)(x) is true of exactly the (codes of the) sentences of     ℒ□K Tn(x). So the truth axioms are restricted to the Tn+1-free part of the language (but 
they can contain occurrences of □, K and Tj for j < n+1). Of course, we need seven 
such axioms for each truth predicate in the language, so the theory !□K Tω(x) contains 
infinitely many (Atn+1) axioms, infinitely many (Comp¬n+1) axioms, and so on.  
 Also, once the truth predicates are part of the language, we can strengthen the 
schemas presented above for □ and K by replacing them with their universally quanti-
                                                                                                                                         
(ii) s = t → (ϕ(s) ↔ ϕ(t)) 
 must restricted to rigid terms s and t. Otherwise it would be easy to come up with counterexamples. 
For the first, let ϕ(x) be “it is known that x is tall” and let t be “the president of Argentina”; and for 
the second let ϕ(x) be “it is known that the morning star is x”, let s be “the morning star” and let t be 
“the evening star”. For more details, see (Fagin et al. 2003, 87ss). 
33 Here I want to be a little less sloppy with the notation. First, val!(x) is a function that, when applied to 
a closed term of ℒ□KTn(x), gives the value of that term at world !. We assume that the function 
val!(x) is primitive recursive, and so representable in !□KTω(x). Second, the expression ¬ is not the 
negation sign but a function that applied to the code of a formula gives the code of its negation. Simi-
larly, in Tn+1(r(t1,…,tk)), r: ωk → ω is a function that applied to (the tuple of codes of) t1,…,tk  out-
puts (the code of) the sentence r(t1,…,tk). And likewise for the other expressions.     
34 Since we have stipulated that we have a term for every object, there is no need to quantify over objects 
or to use a satisfaction predicate in the right part of the biconditional.  
35 It would be redundant to add axioms of the form  
  (TT´n+1) ∀t(Sentℒ□K Tj-1(x)(val!(t)) → (Tn+1(Tj(t)) ↔ Tj(val!(t))) for each j ≤ n.  
 These axioms are unnecessary, since they are cases of (Atn).  
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fied versions. For example, instead of (□-fact) the theory will contain for each n, an 
axiom of the form ∀y(Sentℒ□K Tn(x)(y) → (□Tn+1(y) → Tn+1(y))) and instead of (K-fact) 
the theory will contain for each n, an axiom of the form ∀y(Sentℒ□K Tn(x)(y) → 
(KTn+1(y) → Tn+1(y))). So there is no need to use knowledge and necessity predicates 
to express quantifications involving those modalities. The complex predicates □Tn(x) 
and KTn(x) (for each n) do all the work. In this way, the theory is as expressive and as 
deductively powerful as the approach that treats modalities as predicates.36  
 In order to establish the consistency of the theory !□K Tω(x), we now construct a 
natural model for it. The model is not only designed to show the consistency of the 
theory, but also to show that we can interpret the modal operators in a plausible way. 
It is unproblematic to assume that the theory !□K has models of the form <W, R□, 
RK, I!>. It is only the truth predicates that might generate a problem. A model ℳ for 
the theory !□K Tω(x) will be a structure of the form <W, R□, RK, Iw, Ext>, where Ext: W 
x {Tn | n ∈ ω} → ℘(Sentℒ□K Tω(x)) is a function that assigns an extension to each truth 
predicate at each world ! ∈ W. We impose the following condition on Ext: 
 For every ! ∈ W and every ϕ in ℒ□K Tn(x), (ℳ, !, Ext) ⊨ Tn+1 ⌜ϕ⌝ if and only 
if (ℳ,%!, Ext) ⊨ ϕ 
Here the notation ‘(ℳ, !, Ext) ⊨ ϕ’ is used to represent the fact that the formula ϕ is 
true relative to the model ℳ, the world ! and the function Ext. It is clear that the 
structure <W, R□, RK, Iw, Ext> will make every axiom of !□K true. It remains to show 
that the new axioms for truth are true in this structure (for each n). We just present 
the proofs for the novel axioms (□Tn+1), (KTn+1) and (TTn+1).  
Proof for (□Tn+1) and (KTn+1): Assume that for some model ℳ (with the features de-
scribed), world ! and function Ext, (ℳ, !, Ext) ⊨ Tn+1 ⌜□ϕ⌝ for some formula ϕ 
∈ Sentℒ□K Tn(x). By the definition of Ext, that holds if and only if (ℳ, !, Ext) ⊨ □ϕ. 
Applying the semantic clause for □, we know that the previous fact holds if and only 
if (ℳ, !, Ext) ⊨ ϕ for each world ! such that !R□!. This is the case if and only if 
(ℳ, !, Ext) ⊨ Tn+1 ⌜ϕ⌝ for each world ! such that !R□!. In turn, by the semantic 
clause for □, this holds if and only if (ℳ, !, Ext) ⊨ □Tn+1 ⌜ϕ⌝.   
For (KTn+1) just replace in the previous paragraph □ everywhere by K.  
Proof for (TTn+1): Assume that for some model ℳ (with the features described 
above), world ! and function Ext, (ℳ, !, Ext) ⊨ Tn+1 ⌜Tj(t)⌝ for some term t such 
that val!(t) = ϕ for some formula ϕ ∈ Sentℒ□K Tj-1(x). By the definition of Ext, this 
holds if and only if (ℳ, !, Ext) ⊨ Tj ⌜ϕ⌝. And this is the case if and only if (ℳ, !, 
Ext) ⊨ ϕ, which holds if and only if (ℳ, !, Ext) ⊨ Tn+1 ⌜ϕ⌝.           
 
                                                      
36 A technical argument supporting this claim is developed in (Halbach and Welch 2009).    
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This is enough to establish: 
(Theorem 5)  !□K Tω(x) is consistent.  
 It can be shown that !□K Tω(x) has other attractive features in addition to being con-
sistent. For example, we can recover the T-schema for well behaved sentences: 
  
(Theorem 6) If a formula ϕ has no occurrences of Tj for j > n, then % ⊦!□K Tω(x) Tn+1 ⌜ϕ⌝ ↔ ϕ for each n ∈ ω.  
Proof: This can be proved by a simple induction on the complexity of ϕ, as the reader 
can check for herself.                  
 It is clear from the previous theorem that the T-schema does not hold unrestrict-
edly. For instance, Tn ⌜ϕ⌝ ↔ ϕ is not a theorem of !□K Tω(x) if ϕ contains an occur-
rence of Tn. This shows that multimodal paradoxes are no longer a problem. Although 
a sentence such as A ↔ ¬□Tn ⌜KTn ⌜A⌝⌝ is provable in the theory using the Diag-
onal Lemma, no contradiction follows from it, since A involves an occurrence of Tn.  
 As a corollary of the preceding theorem we obtain the following nice interaction 
result between truth and necessity on the one hand, and truth and knowledge on the 
other: 
 (Theorem 7) If a formula ϕ has no occurrences of Tj for j > n, then:  % ├%!□K Tω(x) □Tn+1 ⌜ϕ⌝ ↔ □ϕ, and  % ├%!□K Tω(x) KTn+1 ⌜ϕ⌝ ↔ Kϕ.37 
8. Capturing the Knowability Argument   
The theory !□K Tω(x) has two interesting features that might be relevant to properly 
evaluate the Knowability Argument. First, it could be argued that using schematic ver-
sions of the relevant principles in the argument is unsatisfactory, especially when these 
principles are available in quantificational form. So the reasoning should go through 
even for quantified versions of the principles. Second, the Knowability Principle says 
that every truth is knowable. So it should be formalized using the truth predicate. Tak-
ing into consideration these two observations, we formalize the Knowability Principle 
in the following way:   
(KPn+1) ∀y(Sentℒ□K  Tn(x)(y) → (Tn+1(y) → ◊KTn+1(y)))38 
And actually, there is one statement of this form for each n.  
                                                      
37 This last theorem might seem controversial since some philosophers argue that an agent can know 
something without knowing it is true. However, pursuing this issue here would take me too far from 
the point I am trying to make. A careful discussion is provided in (Pailos & Rosenblatt 2013).    
38 The reason for adding a truth predicate in the consequent as well is that in our theory KT(x) plays the 
role of the knowledge predicate (actually, we should formalize the consequent as ◊T(KT(x)), but we 
will omit the second truth predicate to simplify things).    
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 Is it possible to reconstruct Fitch’s derivation using this principle and other princi-
ples available in our theory? The answer is yes. This is immediate from the fact that 
for every appropriate formula ϕ and each n we can replace Tn+1 ⌜ϕ⌝%and ϕ in every 
context. A less direct way of checking that the derivation goes through is the follow-
ing.39  
 Assume that for some model ℳ of the theory !□K Tω(x), world ! and function Ext 
it is the case that (ℳ, !, Ext) ⊨ ∀y(Sentℒ□K Tn(x)(y) → (Tn+1(y) → ◊KTn+1(y)))) for 
some n > 1. Assuming that Tn ⌜ϕ⌝ ∧ ¬KTn ⌜ϕ⌝ is a sentence of ℒ□K Tn(x) for some 
sentence ϕ of ℒ□K Tn-1(x), this implies that:  
(ℳ,%!, Ext) ⊨ Tn+1 ⌜Tn ⌜ϕ⌝ ∧ ¬ K Tn ⌜ϕ⌝⌝ → ◊KTn+1 ⌜Tn ⌜ϕ⌝ ∧           
¬ K Tn ⌜ϕ⌝⌝. 
However, it can be shown that (ℳ, !, Ext) ⊨ ¬◊KTn+1 ⌜Tn ⌜ϕ⌝ ∧ ¬ K Tn ⌜ϕ⌝⌝. 
For suppose that (ℳ, !, Ext) ⊨ KTn+1 ⌜Tn ⌜ϕ⌝ ∧ ¬ K Tn ⌜ϕ⌝⌝. Then (ℳ, !, Ext) ⊨ Tn+1 ⌜Tn ⌜ϕ⌝ ∧ ¬ K Tn ⌜ϕ⌝⌝ for every ! such that !RK!. By the definition of 
Ext, (ℳ, !, Ext) ⊨ Tn ⌜ϕ⌝ ∧ ¬KTn ⌜ϕ⌝ for every ! such that !RK!, so (ℳ, !, 
Ext) ⊨ Tn ⌜ϕ⌝ for every ! such that !RK!, and (ℳ, !, Ext) ⊨ ¬KTn ⌜ϕ⌝ for every !% such that !RK!. This means that (ℳ, !, Ext) ⊨ KTn ⌜ϕ⌝ and (ℳ, !, Ext) ⊨ 
K¬KTn ⌜ϕ⌝). By the reflexivity of RK, this last claim implies that (ℳ, !, Ext)%⊨%
¬KTn ⌜ϕ⌝. And this is a contradiction. So, as we said before, (ℳ, !, Ext) ⊨ 
¬◊KTn+1 ⌜Tn ⌜ϕ⌝ ∧ ¬ K Tn ⌜ϕ⌝⌝. But then we can infer that (ℳ, !, Ext) ⊨ 
¬Tn+1 ⌜Tn ⌜ϕ⌝ ∧ ¬ K Tn ⌜ϕ⌝⌝. By Ext, this implies that (ℳ, !, Ext) ⊨ ¬(Tn ⌜ϕ⌝ 
∧ ¬KTn ⌜ϕ⌝). It follows that (ℳ, !, Ext) ⊨ Tn ⌜ϕ⌝ → KTn ⌜ϕ⌝. Since this holds 
for any n > 0, we can infer that each (KPn) is false.   
9. Closing remarks 
The reasoning in the last section shows that !□K Tω(x) is capable of representing Fitch’s 
reasoning and that adding the Knowability Principle to the theory !□KTω(x) leads to 
something clearly false. So the best theory the type-theorist has available for solving 
other well-known paradoxes does not block the Knowability Argument. This is an  
advantage, I think, over theories that type truth, knowledge and other modal predi-
cates. Although the typing of knowledge is useful to block both Fitch’s reasoning and 
Montague’s paradox for knowledge, the truth-types are still needed to avoid truth-
theoretic paradoxes. Since knowledge and truth are both typed, either we run into 
multimodal paradoxes or we have to set up some unattractive mixed hierarchy of 
predicates. Neither alternative seem satisfactory. Hence, it seems that if the Knowabil-
ity Argument is to be rejected, the best way to do that is not by means of knowledge-
types.  
 
                                                      
39 For a similar reasoning see (Horsten 2009).  
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 Moreover, the demand that paradoxes of the same family should receive the same 
sort of solution is satisfied only to some extent on the approach that has types for 
every predicate. While it is true the every paradox is avoided by the use of types, truth-
theoretic paradoxes require truth-types, the paradoxes of knowledge require 
knowledge-types, and so on. On the account that emulates modal predicates by using 
truth, every paradox is avoided by the use of truth-types. 
 
REFERENCES 
Carrara, Massimiliano and Davide Fassio. 2011. Why Knowledge Should Not Be Typed: An Argument 
against the Type Solution to the Knowability Paradox. Theoria 77: 180-193.  
Fagin, Ronald, Joseph, Halpern, Yoram, Moses, and Moshe Vardi. 1995. Reasoning about Knowledge. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Fitch, Frederic. 1963. A logical analysis of some value concepts. The Journal of Symbolic Logic 28: 135-42.   
Halbach, Volker. 2011. Axiomatic theories of truth. New York: Cambridge University Press.    
—. 2008. On a side effect of solving Fitch´s paradox by typing knowledge. Analysis 68: 114-120. 
— and Philip Welch. 2009. Necessities and Necessary Truths: A Prolegomenon to the Use of Modal 
Logic in the Analysis of Intensional Notions. Mind 118: 71-100. 
Hart, William. 2009. Invincible Ignorance. In New essays on the knowability paradox, ed. Joe Salerno, 320-323. 
New York: Oxford University Press.  
Horsten, Leon. 2009. Levity. Mind 118: 555-581.  
Jenkins, Carrie. 2009. The Mystery of the Disappearing Diamond. In New essays on the knowability paradox, 
ed. Joe Salerno, 302-319. New York: Oxford University Press.      
Kripke, Saul. 1975. Outline of a theory of truth. The Journal of Philosophy 72: 690-716.  
Kvanvig, Jonathan. 2008. The Knowability Paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Linsky, Bernard. 2009. Logical types in some arguments about knowability and belief. In New essays on the 
knowability paradox, ed. Joe Salerno, 163-181. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Montague, Richard. 1963. Syntactical treatments of modality, with corollaries on reflexion principles and 
finite axiomatizability. Acta Philosophica Fennica 16: 155-67. (Reprinted in Montague 1974). 
—. 1974. Formal Philosophy: Selected Papers of Richard Montague. New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press.   
Pailos, Federico and Lucas Rosenblatt. Forthcoming 2014. Solving Multimodal Paradoxes. Theoria. 
Paseau, Alexander. 2009. How to type: reply to Halbach. Analysis 69: 280-286.  
—. 2008. Fitch’s argument and typing knowledge. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 49: 155-176.  
Salerno, Joe, ed. 2009. New essays on the knowability paradox, New York: Oxford University Press.  
Priest, Graham. 2009. Beyond the Limits of Knowledge. In New essays on the knowability paradox, ed. Joe Sa-
lerno, 93-104. New York: Oxford University Press. 
LUCAS ROSENBLATT is Teaching Assistant and PhD Student at the University of Buenos Aires. He writes 
mainly on issues in philosophical logic, especially on paradoxes and non-classical logic. 
ADDRESS: Puan 480, Factultad de Filosofia y Letras, University of Buenos Aires, Ciudad de Buenos Aires, 
Argentina. E-mail: l_rosenblatt@hotmail.com 
